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I would like to address a topic 
that I first discussed in the spring of 
2003. Back then, I said the time had 
come for the Fed to adopt an explicit 
inflation targeting program. I noted 
that quite a few countries around the 
globe had already done so successfully. 
I acknowledged that for an inflation 
targeting program to be successful 
in the U.S., it would have to address 
our unique circumstances here, as 
well as resolve some practical chal-
lenges. Nonetheless, I expressed some 
optimism that these issues could be 
resolved.*
Since that time, there has 
been a good bit more discussion and 
research into the concept of inflation 
targeting for the U.S.  I would like to 
extend that discussion by proposing 
S
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a specific inflation targeting program 
for consideration. My hope is that, by 
laying out a specific inflation target-
ing proposal, I can help move the 
public discussion to the level of detail 
necessary to develop and implement 
inflation targeting in the U.S.
People might ask why the 
U.S. should move forward on inflation 
targeting now. For 25 years, the Fed 
has steadily reduced inflation and in-
flation expectations, without resorting 
to an explicit inflation target.  Indeed, 
the case can be made that the Fed has 
been remarkably successful over this 
period, and we have now achieved es-
sential price stability. Hence, it might 
seem that there is no reason to adopt 
an explicit inflation target at this 
point.  
However, having achieved 
price stability, we must still deal with 
the matter of maintaining it. I believe 
an explicit inflation target can help us 
do that. By defining what it means by 
price stability, the Fed would not only 
better inform market participants of its 
intentions but would also strengthen 
their capacity to monitor the Fed’s per-
formance. This makes it more difficult 
for the central bank to compromise 
its objective some time down the line 
and hence heightens the commitment. 
Thus, a well-formulated inflation tar-
geting program would give the public 
good reason to be more confident in 
the Fed’s commitment to a stable price 
environment.
I do not foresee undue 
inflationary pressures building any 
time soon. I believe price pressures are, 
and will remain, well contained. So 
my point is not that higher inflation 
is an imminent threat and we need an 
inflation target to avert it. My point is 
just the opposite. I think that setting 
an inflation target at a time of price 
stability makes eminently good sense. 
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It would clarify the Fed’s definition 
of its price stability goal – and seal its 
commitment to price stability – with-
out requiring the Fed to shift its cur-
rent policy strategy. Plus it would not 
disrupt the economy.
Suppose the Fed were to 
announce an explicit inflation target 
at this point. I daresay that the Fed’s 
credibility right now is such that the 
market would expect the Fed to adhere 
to it. So the public’s inflation expecta-
tions would match the Fed’s inten-
tions. Having achieved that match, 
the Fed would be loath to break it and 
would risk doing so only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances. That, in 
short, is why this is a good time for the 
Fed to adopt an inflation target.  
So, what exactly would such 
an inflation targeting program look 
like, and what specifically would my 
desired goal be? 
   
WHY INFLATION TARGETING?
Let me begin by briefly 
reviewing the potential benefits of 
inflation targeting. Both economic 
theory and experience demonstrate 
that securing a low and stable rate of 
inflation is the most important contri-
bution a central bank can make to sus-
taining maximum economic growth. 
Price stability helps promote economic 
efficiency by allowing economic agents 
to discern relative price changes clearly 
and allocate current resources to their 
best use. It reduces uncertainty about 
the future and encourages both higher 
levels of investment and investment in 
the most productive projects. Equally 
important, it reduces the harmful dis-
tributional effects of both anticipated 
and unanticipated inflation.
Note that the stable price 
environment I have just described 
includes not only low inflation in the 
present but also market participants’ 
expectations of low inflation in the 
future. Thus, it is important for the 
central bank not only to achieve low 
inflation but also to  make a commit-
ment to maintaining low inflation.
Finally, the public must find 
the commitment credible. This is a 
fundamental element of true price sta-
bility. In simple terms, a central bank’s 
commitment can be deemed fully cred-
ible only if the public’s expectations 
about the future course of inflation 
exactly match the central bank’s stated 
intentions with respect to the future 
course of inflation.
So the question is: Why 
would the public expect inflation to 
behave in accordance with the central 
bank’s stated intentions? Economists 
would say that the only reason to 
believe that individuals or institutions 
will act in accordance with their stated 
intentions is that it would be in their 
interest to do so when the time for 
action comes. So, it is reasonable to 
believe that the central bank will take 
the actions necessary to maintain low 
and stable inflation only insofar as the 
central bank will always see that the 
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.     
The problem is that the 
central bank may occasionally be 
tempted to pursue overly stimulative 
monetary policies in order to boost 
economic activity today at the expense 
of containing inflation tomorrow. This 
is all the more likely to happen after 
inflation has been under control for 
some time and the action thus seems 
relatively “harmless.” Recognizing this, 
the public has reason to be skeptical 
that the central bank will carry out 
its stated intentions to maintain low 
and stable inflation over the long term 
without some form of commitment to 
the goal. Establishing an explicit infla-
tion target overcomes this problem by 
increasing the benefits of sticking with 
the low inflation policy and increasing 
the costs of deviating from it.
An inflation targeting 
program is like a contract between 
the public and the Fed. It states, in 
explicit terms, what the Fed means by 
its goal of price stability. As long as the 
Fed abides by the contract — that is, 
achieves its inflation target as speci-
fied — the public, too, will abide by 
the contract — that is, will expect the 
Fed to continue achieving its inflation 
target as specified. Conversely, if the 
Fed allows inflation to stray outside 
the target range, essentially failing to 
live up to its part of the contract, the 
public will alter its expectations about 
future inflation accordingly.   
Such a shift in expectations 
would be costly to the economy be-
cause it is only when the central bank’s 
inflation intentions, the public’s infla-
tion expectations, and actual inflation 
all match up that we have a stable 
price environment. In such circum-
stances, investors are making optimal 
decisions, and the economy is deliver-
ing optimal outcomes — both in terms 
of price stability and real growth. 
An explicit inflation target 
would give the Fed a stronger incentive 
to act as it says it intends to. Recogniz-
ing this, the public would consider the 
Fed’s commitment to low and stable 
inflation more credible, and thus, the 
full benefits of a stable price environ-
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ment are more likely to be realized. 
Put another way, an explicit inflation 
target would make the socially optimal 
monetary policy what economists call 
a time-consistent one. 
THE DUAL MANDATE
Before I go any further, let me 
address one other point. As a member 
of the FOMC, I recognize that by law 
the Federal Reserve has a mandate 
that goes beyond just price stability. 
In advocating inflation targeting, I am 
sensitive to our dual mandate and the 
need to pursue our economic stabiliza-
tion goals. 
Undoubtedly, a commitment 
to maintain a stable price environ-
ment limits the latitude the Fed has in 
pursuing these stabilization goals. But 
this is not the result of adopting an 
inflation target. It is simply a reality, 
given the way monetary policy affects 
the economy. All else constant, add-
ing monetary stimulus helps generate 
output and employment and also puts 
upward pressure on the price level. 
Therefore, recognizing our 
dual mandate does not speak against 
the wisdom of inflation targeting as 
much as it recognizes the difficulty 
of conducting appropriate monetary 
policy where our objectives are intrin-
sically intertwined. In fact, a case can 
be made that the clarity and confi-
dence afforded by an explicit inflation 
target may actually enhance the Fed’s 
capacity to achieve the dual goals of 
price stability and strong economic 
performance. Once the public’s infla-
tion expectations are well anchored, 
changes in short-term nominal interest 
rates, and in current prices, send a 
clearer signal about changes in real 
interest rates and intertemporal shifts 
in relative prices. These improved 
signals should evoke stronger responses 
from market participants and hence 
heighten the responsiveness of the 
economy to monetary policy actions.  
In short, I do not think of 
inflation targeting as restricting the 
Fed to the pursuit of just one goal, 
but rather as empowering the Fed to 
pursue its two goals with alacrity. 
  Having said that, I recognize 
that the inflation targeting program we 
establish must afford the Fed enough 
flexibility to respond appropriately 
to various economic disturbances. 
We should remember that the U.S. 
achieved its current price stability with 
a policy framework I have previously 
referred to as one of “flexible com-
mitment.” In my view, an inflation 
targeting framework that precluded an 
appropriate policy response to eco-
nomic disturbances would be sub-opti-
mal from the social point of view and 
would not be credible in the eyes of the 
public.   
THE PROPOSAL
With this as background, let 
me move to my inflation targeting pro-
posal. Here the devil is in the details. 
In my view, any inflation proposal 
must address at least three distinct 
but interrelated questions:  Should the 
target be a single number or a range? 
Over what time interval should the 
target be set? And which measure 
of inflation should be targeted? To 
advance the discussion on an inflation 
target for the U.S., let me offer a con-
crete proposal: The Fed should establish 
a target band of 1 to 3 percent for annual 
inflation, as measured by the 12-month 
moving average rate of change in the core 
PCE deflator. 
Why these specific features?   
Setting a Range. Let’s ad-
dress the first question: Why should we 
set an annual target band rather than 
a single long-run value or central ten-
dency, as advocated by my colleague 
Ben Bernanke? My answer is based on 
two features of the practical world in 
which we live.  
First, FOMC members may 
have different opinions about the 
optimal long-run inflation rate.  Dif-
ferent models of the economy and 
different assessments of society’s 
preferences can create legitimate dif-
ferences of opinion. So it is unlikely, 
and even unreasonable, to expect that 
the FOMC members could agree to a 
single number for an inflation target. 
Nonetheless, the FOMC members 
could presumably be comfortable with 
a target band for inflation.
Once the FOMC members 
established a target band, it would help 
them coordinate their decision-mak-
ing. FOMC members would know that 
as long as inflation is well within the 
target band, they have the latitude to 
consider a variety of stabilization strat-
egies. But as inflation approaches the 
boundaries of the target band, FOMC 
members would realize that they need 
to focus on strategies for keeping infla-
tion within the band, properly taking 
into account the lags and uncertainties 
surrounding the impact of monetary 
policy.
Second, establishing a target 
band for inflation would also help the 
FOMC communicate its intentions to 
the public more clearly. People would 
know that inflation outside the target 
band is clearly unacceptable to the 
In setting the [target] 
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Fed, and they could expect the Fed 
to take action to bring it back “in 
bounds.”  
In setting the band, the Fed 
would also communicate to the public 
its assessment of the short-run volatil-
ity in inflation that is consistent with 
the Fed’s maintaining price stability 
in the long run. The reality is that 
monetary policy cannot deliver the 
same degree of price stability over in-
tervals as short as a month or a quarter 
as it can over the course of a year. 
More precisely, it can do so only at 
the expense of creating an unaccept-
able degree of short-run instability in 
economic activity. So the width of the 
Fed’s target band would indicate how 
much short-run inflation volatility the 
Fed has decided to accept in order to 
limit short-run output volatility, given 
the economy’s underlying structure. 
This information should help prevent 
unnecessary inflation or deflation 
“scares” when the inflation rate ac-
celerates or decelerates.
So in my view an annual 
band for inflation serves as a practi-
cal device for coordinating decisions 
among FOMC members and commu-
nicating clearly with the public.  
Nonetheless, one might object 
that a single long-run value would pro-
vide a more precise anchor for long-run 
inflation expectations than would an 
annual band. Mathematically speak-
ing, that may be true, of course. Yet, 
from a practical point of view, I think 
an annual target band establishes the 
stronger anchor. An annual target 
band gives the public a clear criterion 
by which it can monitor and assess the 
Fed’s performance against its stated 
inflation objective on a continuous 
basis. Recognizing this, the Fed would 
always have the incentive to keep 
inflation in the target band and would 
weigh seriously any policy actions that 
risked pushing inflation outside the 
band. Public monitoring would not be 
brought to bear in the same way if the 
Fed had a single-value long-run infla-
tion target. 
To use a simple metaphor, 
let me suggest that we are building a 
road, or highway, to continued price 
stability. On my highway, I would 
paint white lines along the shoulders, 
making it clear when the car is veering 
too far from the center of the road. If 
the car drifts toward the white line, 
the driver will likely react. If the driver 
does not, the passenger probably will. 
With the single long-run target, the 
highway has no white lines to encour-
age the driver to stay on course. So 
the car is more likely to stray from the 
center of the highway, and the driver 
and passenger are less likely to react 
in time to keep from running off the 
road. For this reason, both driver and 
passenger are likely to feel more confi-
dent about reaching their destination if 
they take a well-marked highway. 
Similarly, the Fed is more 
likely to follow policy consistent with 
long-run price stability, and the public 
is likely to be more confident that it 
will, under an inflation targeting pro-
gram that specifies an annual inflation 
target band.  
To recap, I think setting an 
annual inflation target band has signif-
icant practical benefits. It would help 
coordinate decision-making among 
FOMC members; it would improve 
the FOMC’s communication with the 
public; and it would build public con-
fidence that prices will remain stable 
over the long run. 
Focusing on an Annual 
Target Range. In regard to a target 
band for annual inflation, I believe the 
12-month moving average of an infla-
tion measure provides a relatively clear 
signal to the public – and to the Fed 
– of the Fed’s inflation performance.  
Taking the 12-month moving average 
eliminates the “noise” of highly transi-
tory movements in prices. 
At the same time, it strength-
ens the “signal” of a change in trend 
inflation that a longer term moving 
average might obscure. For example, 
suppose the Fed focused on the three-
year moving average of inflation rather 
than the one-year moving average. 
Further suppose that inflation had 
averaged 1 percent for two-and-a-half 
years, then ratcheted up to 4 percent 
for six months. A three-year moving 
average of inflation would still be only 
1.5 percent, not an alarming number. 
But I would argue that six months of 4 
percent inflation should certainly trig-
ger a change in policy. 
In short, targeting the 
inflation rate over an annual interval 
seems to bring the right focus both 
to the Fed’s decision-making and to 
the public’s monitoring of the Fed’s 
performance. 
A Band of 1 Percent to 3 
Percent to Start. Having explained 
why I think a year is the right interval 
for the inflation target, let me turn to 
the companion issue: why I think 1 
percent to 3 percent is the right band 
for the inflation target. 
Setting the right band pres-
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ents an interesting problem. I think 
there is consensus that an annual 
inflation rate of more than 3 percent 
does not represent price stability and 
that annual inflation below 1 percent 
provides too little cushion against the 
risk of deflation in times of economic 
weakness. So a band of 1 percent to 3 
percent seems to be a reasonable start-
ing point.  
But should the band be 
tighter? Perhaps. As I will explain in 
a moment, our recent history suggests 
that a tighter band is feasible. Ulti-
mately, perhaps, we will want to move 
in that direction.  
However, I think starting 
with a band wide enough to command 
broad agreement is crucial. The reason 
is that it must be beyond dispute 
that any inflation targeting program 
respects the Fed’s dual mandate: to 
maintain stable prices and a stable 
economy. While an inflation target-
ing program must preclude the Fed 
from compromising on its delivery 
of low and stable inflation, it must 
also allow the Fed the flexibility to 
respond appropriately to economic 
disturbances. As Chairman Greenspan 
indicated some time ago, monetary 
policy is, in the end, an exercise in risk 
management. Any policy regime must 
permit an appropriate, and immediate, 
response by the central bank to short-
term disturbances without concern 
about signaling a regime change.  
Admittedly, a plan that gives 
the Fed too much flexibility will do 
little to increase public confidence in 
the Fed’s commitment to price stabil-
ity. But I would point out that a plan 
that gives the Fed too little flexibility 
would turn out to be equally uncon-
vincing and potentially dangerous.  
Suppose an overly restric-
tive inflation targeting program was 
in place. Now, further suppose that a 
significant shock hit the economy. The 
Fed would face a difficult choice: pur-
sue the appropriate stabilization policy 
or follow its very restrictive inflation 
targeting program. If the Fed sticks to 
its inflation plan, and that program 
is, in fact, overly restrictive, the Fed 
will have needlessly compromised the 
economy’s performance. If the Fed 
deviates from the inflation plan and 
pursues the appropriate stabilization 
policy, people will not know whether 
the action represents a lack of commit-
ment to price stability or a temporary 
deviation from the inflation target 
path that does not compromise the 
Fed’s commitment to price stability.
The bottom line is that an 
overly restrictive inflation targeting 
program either needlessly compromises 
the Fed’s performance on the stabiliza-
tion front or needlessly undermines 
public confidence in the Fed’s com-
mitment to price stability. My sense is 
that the wise strategy is to start with a 
relatively wide band for our inflation 
target and perhaps consider narrowing 
it in the future, as we gain experience.  
 Some might argue that the 1 
percent to 3 percent band is itself too 
narrow and could constrain the Fed 
from effectively pursuing its economic 
stabilization objective. However, I do 
not think that should be a serious 
problem. Consider our recent eco-
nomic history.
Since the mid-1990s, we 
have experienced several interna-
tional financial crises, a stock market 
boom and bust, and a direct attack 
on the nation’s capital and its finan-
cial center. We have been through 
an entire business cycle from strong 
expansion, through recession, through 
recovery, and into expansion again. 
In the course of responding to these 
events, the Fed has moved its target 
fed funds rate over a range of 500 basis 
points. Over that period, the 12-month 
average core PCE inflation rate has 
moved within a band of 1 percent to 2 
percent.  That suggests that a two-per-
centage-point band on this measure of 
inflation should provide the Fed with 
sufficient latitude to conduct stabiliza-
tion policy. 
Of course, we cannot know 
for sure what lies ahead.  We may yet 
encounter some very unusual situation 
in which responding effectively to a 
disturbance would push inflation out-
side the inflation target band. Yet, the 
very rarity of the situation may allow 
the Fed to respond without any loss 
of credibility. Presumably, the unusual 
nature of the situation would make it 
easily recognizable, much as the events 
I just catalogued were. As long as the 
Fed clearly communicated how it was 
dealing with the situation and, once it 
passed, began moving inflation back 
within its target band, its credibility 
could be preserved. 
At the end of the day, a 1 
percent to 3 percent inflation target is 
a reasonable way to implement a policy 
aimed at preserving price stability. It 
would serve to keep inflation low and 
stable, without overly constraining 
the Fed from reacting to economic or 
financial disturbances.  
Why the Core PCE De-
flator? Now let me turn to the last 
question of the proposal: the inflation 
measure itself.   The choice of the PCE 
deflator is relatively straightforward. 
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Recent theoretical work on 
optimal monetary policy offers three 
lessons. First, it is optimal for the cen-
tral bank to establish a low and stable 
rate of inflation. Second, it is optimal 
for the central bank to respond to 
disturbances that affect economic 
activity. Third, optimal monetary 
policy does the most good when people 
understand what that optimal policy is 
and expect the central bank to execute 
it. To put it another way, optimal mon-
etary policy is most effective when it is 
both transparent and credible. 
By those standards, I be-
lieve my proposed inflation targeting 
program would move the Fed a step 
closer to conducting optimal monetary 
policy. It would help the Fed establish 
a low and stable rate of inflation. It 
would not unduly restrict the Fed’s 
ability to respond to economic distur-
bances. And by increasing the trans-
parency and credibility of Fed policy, 
it would enhance the Fed’s overall 
effectiveness.  
The Fed has been focusing on this 
measure in recent years, and I see 
no reason to change that.  The PCE 
deflator is a broader measure than 
the consumer price index.  Also, it is 
a chain-weighted index and so takes 
account of consumers’ shifting among 
goods and services as relative prices 
change.  Consequently, it reflects re-
cent changes in the overall price level 
more accurately than the CPI, which 
is based on a fixed basket of goods and 
services.  
However, I prefer targeting 
the core PCE deflator, that is, the 
deflator less its food and energy price 
components. Like using a 12-month 
moving average, using the core PCE 
helps reduce the “noise” in the infla-
tion signal, enhancing its value as 
a monitoring device. In light of the 
recent run-up in oil prices, it is worth 
emphasizing that the choice of the 
core PCE deflator essentially insulates 
the Fed from having to respond to 
such shocks in order to achieve its 
inflation target. Large as it was, the 
recent run-up in oil prices has had 
B R
relatively little impact on core PCE. 
Thus, the inflation targeting program 
will not induce the Fed to tighten ag-
gressively when oil prices rise or ease 
aggressively when they fall.  
In short, my proposal is not 
an elaborate one by any means. It does 
not codify any new Fed procedures. It 
does not specify a particular reaction 
function for monetary policy. It does 
not set a timetable for returning infla-
tion to target when deviations occur. It 
simply defines what the Fed means by 
price stability and thereby reinforces 
the Fed’s commitment to, and the 
public’s confidence in, its preservation.  
SUMMARY
I believe a program of explicit 
inflation targeting is a logical next step 
for the Fed to take in its commitment 
to preserve the stable price environ-
ment it has worked so long and so hard 
to achieve. A specific inflation target 
such as the one I propose here – 1 
percent to 3 percent inflation in the 
12-month moving average of the core 
PCE – could be that step.  